Introduction

The word propaganda has today all possible pejorative connotations. And probably the main reason of this negative echo is the use of the word by the German National-Socialist regime. Adolf Hitler even created a new ministry for propaganda purposes. The function of that ministry was to control all the communications means and acts. The man in charge of the new ministry, one of Adolf Hitler’s closest collaborators, was Joseph Goebbels. Both names belong now to the long list of the history of human infamy. Goebbels’ concepts and techniques to apply communication at the service of the party and the regime are revealing. The study of his propaganda activity is the best way to inquire into the not always clear line that separates propaganda and strategic communication.

Still, the word propaganda did not always have the current echo of totalitarianism and manipulation. The first record we have of the use of this term is a document of the Catholic Church. In 1622, Pope Gregory XV founded the Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide (The Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Catholic Faith). For many centuries, the Catholic Church had been using the power of weapons and armies in order to expand its realm on earth and gain proselytes. With the new congregation, the Catholic Church entrusted communication, instead of the use of force, to spread the message of Jesus Christ. And that happened not because the institution was loosing power, but because the Catholic Church became aware that communication was more effective than violence when it came to the propagation of ideas and beliefs.

The word propaganda comes from the Latin verb propagare. The original meaning and the etymological root of this verb has been kept in many European languages. The verbs to propagate (English), propagieren (German), propagar (Spanish), propagare (Italian), or propager (French) have the same meaning as the Latin root: to spread or distribute something. The use of this word is rather neutral, as was the use of the word propaganda in its origins.

Language, as Jacques Derrida (1972) taught us, cannot escape the influence of historical events or of social and political circumstances. Words are frequently used as instruments of power against particular groups of people. The meaning of those words will always connect the relationship of language and abuses of power. The word propaganda bears one of the worst stigmas history has ever imposed upon language.

In his classic definition, the pioneer in communication studies Harold L. Lasswell describes propaganda as “The manipulation of symbols as a means of influencing attitudes on controversial matters” (Lasswell , 1942, p.106). More recently, Pratkanis and Aronson (1991) defined propaganda as “mass suggestion or influence through the manipulation of symbols and the psychology of the individual” (Pratkanis & Aronson, 1991, p.11). Finally, in their comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon, Joswett and O’Donnel defined propaganda as “the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (Joswett, & O’Donnell, 1999, p.3).

These three definitions of propaganda seem to have two factors in common. First of all, propaganda is a form of human interaction based on symbols, and thus, an act of communication. Second, and even more important, is the recurrent appearance of the term manipulation. All the authors seem to agree that the goal of propaganda is to achieve a change in the mind or behavior or people – masses of people to be accurate. Thus, propaganda is, first of all a form of mass persuasion. But is there any difference between mass-persuasion and manipulation? Is any attempt to change the mind or behavior of the audiences – this is basically what persuasion means – the same as manipulation?

The factor that seems to differentiate manipulation from other ethically legitimate attempts to change the mind or the behavior of the audience is the transparency of the persuasive intention or the goals pursued though the intended change of mind or behavior. We manipulate when we try to modify the attitude or behavior of people without them being aware of our persuasive intention or the final purpose of changing their minds. If there is no deception or occultation of that final intention, we cannot talk of manipulation.

During the 1920s, following Sigmund Freud’s theory of the subconscious, there were widely spread theories and treatises that tried to explore ways to control the will of individuals and masses. Some of those theories achieved a notable popularity in Germany. Many movies of the 1910s and 1920s, containing excellent examples of the cinematographic style known as German Expressionism, are about the power of individuals to control the will of individuals and masses. Perhaps the two most celebrated examples are Dr, Caligari, the character in Robert Wiene’s classic The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (1919), and the mysterious Dr. Mabuse (1922), from Fritz Lang’s movie with the same title. Siegfried Kracauer (1979) has seen in those disturbing characters antecedents of Adolf Hitler. The hypothesis is most probably overblown. The myth of dark powers that controls the will of the people beyond their knowledge or consciousness has always been popular, like speculations about evil conspiracies or esoteric complots.

During the 1950s and 60s, the theory of subliminal persuasion reached a similar popularity and even certain relevance in the academic milieu. The best example offers us Vance Packard’s bestseller The Hidden Persuaders (1958). Among other experiments, Packard reported in his book about the so-called Ice Cream experiment. Static pictures of ice cream were incorporated in movies for a fraction of a second, so that the images never crossed the perception threshold of the spectators. The consumption of ice cream increased significantly during the projection of those movies that included the subliminal advertisements. The popularity of those theories contributed to create the impression that the broad public was helpless against the persuasion industry. However, empirical sciences had never been able to determine the effect of such subliminal attempts to influence the mind or behavior of people (Kunczik, 1996). Quite the converse seems to be the case. Most empirical experiments in the field of persuasion show a stubborn resistance of the individual to yield to persuasive attempts, as stated by Festinger (1957), when those persuasive attempts clash against one’s previous beliefs, values or attitudes.

Joseph Goebbels, became the first German Propaganda Minister immediately after Adolf Hitler was named Chancellor of Germany in 1934. He had run the elections campaign of the National-Socialist candidate the previous year. The goal of the ministry was clearly defined in the actual title of the office: “Reich Minister for People’s Enlightenment and Propaganda”. In his attempts to influence the will of the people Goebbels never used mysterious techniques that were designed to mesmerize audiences and rob them of their will. As we will see, he used actual scientific knowledge to lead the will of the masses, rather than to transform them.

Joseph Goebbels: Hitler’s Propaganda Super-Minister

In spite of the hatred and the repulsion that his very name now arouses, there is something sad in Joseph Goebbels’ story. First of all, his doglike devotion to the Fuehrer makes him a pathetic figure. Joseph Goebbles remained at the side of Adolf Hitler until the very end. He also brought his wife and his children to the final damnation in the notorious Berlin Bunker were Hitler spent the last days of his life. Then, his humble origins and physical handicaps seemed to condemn him to an irrelevant role in life. It is ironic that the ardent promoter of the superiority of the Arian race was an individual with a weak constitution, a cripple. Joseph Goebbels suffered from poliomyelitis (infantile paralysis) at an early age. The disease led to chronic problems: Goebbels’ left leg was 4 inches (around 15 cm) shorter than the right one. This deformity made him the subject of mockery among his fellow students. He never was able to play with them. His isolation was slowly feeding a deep hatred, which made him the perfect example of the resentment that Goebbels’ beloved Philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche had described in Zur Genealogie der Moral (On the Genealogy of Morality – 1994). He wanted to achieve everything that nature seemed to have denied him: popularity, wealth and, of course, power.

The young Joseph Goebbels concentrated all his efforts and energy on his studies. He excelled, above all, in the subjects of History and German Literature. Later he went to different universities in Germany: Bonn, Freiburg, Heidelberg, Würzburg, Cologne, Frankfurt, Berlin and Munich. He concluded his academic career in 1921 with a doctorate in philosophy at the University of Heidelberg. The topic of his dissertation was the work of a relatively unknown German novelist and playwright of the romantic period, Wilhelm von Schütz.

To understand Goebbel’s role as publicist for the Nazi regime, it is important to examine his relationship with the Catholic Church. Both his parents were devoted Catholics and, due to their son’s handicap, wanted him to become a priest. Although he baptized all his children, Goebbels distanced himself from Catholicism and replaced his devotion for God with his unconditional loyalty to the Führer, who “took the place of Christ in Goebbels attachments” (Bramsted, 1965, p.7).

What he most admired about the Church was the effectiveness of the institution to indoctrinate its faith. The whole organization seemed to him the perfect propaganda machine, and he wanted to import it to the party: “Only when the party was in a position to put into every village such well trained and popular functionaries as the church had there now, only then could and it attract the simple folk permanently.” (Stephan, 1949, p.140) Although he took distance from Catholicism – and at the end of his political life saw in this ideology a competitor (the worst one) – Goebbels was aware of the danger of a direct confrontation with the church. This is the reason why he tried to keep the relationship on good terms, even though his ultimate objective was the defeat of the institution: “I have always been against provoking the churches to a fight and whished in contradiction from the Party Chancellery, to maintain the appearance of loyal cooperation. It will be easy after the war to deprive the churches of their material basis and thus to brake their back-bone.” (Stephan, 1949, p. 146)

Goebbels’ first job after completing his doctorate was as an editor for the newspaper Beliner Tagesblatt. Ironically, in his first professional job, both the owner of the newspaper and the editor in chief were Jews.

After this work at the newspaper, he found himself drawn to politics. Goebbels took a position as Franz von Wiegershaus’ private secretary. Franz von Wiegershaus at that time was a deputy at the Reichstag with the Völkische Freiheitspartei, a small group that already anticipated the radical positions regarding nation and race of Hitler’s party.

Goebbels joined the NSDAP (National-Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei – German National-Socialist Labor Party) in 1924. Quickly he became the private secretary of Gregor Strasser, who was one of the pioneers of the NSDAP and a representative of the party at the Reichstag. In 1926, in the presence of Adolf Hitler, Goebbels was allowed for the first time to speak at a meeting of the National-Socialist Party. The Führer was impressed by the way Goebbels addressed the crowd and how he connected with and electrified the mass of followers. From this moment he became part of the hard core of Hitler’s advisors. In November 1928, the Führer put Goebbels in charge of all National-Socialist Party propaganda.

Basic Ideas behind the Propaganda Factory

When Hitler created the ground-breaking Ministry for People’s Enlightenment and Propaganda, the intention was to completely control the flow of information in the country. First, the new office should be able to determine the type of news that was going to reach mass audiences and how this news was going to be perceived by the general public. The ministry was supposed to use all possible communication channels to publicize the party’s ideas, values and objectives. Finally, control over the communication means would also act as a shield against foreign influence (1943).

In addition to being the head of the new ministry, Goebbels remained in charge of two powerful communication institutions: The Central Propaganda office of the Party and the Reich Chamber of Culture. This last institution focused on the creation and distribution of cultural activities and events that matched the principles and guidelines of National-Socialism (Bramsted, 1965).

The relevance of the new ministry in Hitler’s cabinet has also a spatial manifestation. Goebbel’s office was three times bigger that the office of any other of the National-Socialist ministers. The department of People’s Enlightenment and Propaganda soon gained control over traditional offices like the Prussian Press Office and over areas that traditionally belonged to other ministries. For instance Goebbels became responsible for commercial advertising activities for German industry as well as for the management of fairs and industrial or commercial exhibits, which traditionally belonged to the Ministry of Economics. From the Ministry of Transport, Goebbels took over its whole network of travel agencies. The postal branch of this ministry also had to give up the management of the first broadcast institutions in the country. A part of the people’s enlightenment mission was to control the teaching at schools, universities and art academies which had been traditionally the function of the Education Ministry. Finally, Goebbels took charge of the communication aspects of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, becoming responsible for all propaganda strategies abroad (Bramsted, 1965).

Joseph Goebbels ambition of controlling all the information in Germany to aid the party is probable the best example of his and Hitler’s totalitarian delusions. The power over press, radio, literature, even music and art was in the hand of one man – and this man was blindly loyal to the Führer and his ideas.

According to Horst Avenarius (2000), Goebbels’ propaganda’s key concepts could be reduced to four maxims. Two of the maxims had to do with the contents of the messages, and the other two with the delivery of those messages. With regard to the contents, the first of the Nazi propaganda principles was not to allow apparent changes or ambiguities in the world view and interpretation (what the German call Weltanschauung,) of the movement. The public discourse of the National-Socialist party was monolithic and did not change at all in the course of its notorious history. Then, this world view was simplified as much as possible. Both Goebbels and Hitler were convinced of the incapability of the masses to understand a complex discourse. Therefore, the messages that reached them were designed to avoid any excess of cognitive elaboration. The propaganda maxims that dealt with delivery methods, according to Avenarius, were the constant repetition of those simple principles, ideas or statements and the passion with which the messages were delivered to the public. In fact, impressive stage design and theatrical delivery were essential components of the effectiveness of National-Socialist messages.

The inherent simplicity of the messages does not mean that they were improvised or spontaneous. There was a precise machinery behind that simplicity designed to ensure success. Goebbels was pioneer in the systematic use of public opinion research, as well the use of empirical social and behavioral sciences as a basis for campaign planning. The propaganda minister par excellence knew that it was easier to achieve persuasion when the public discourse matched the feelings and values of the people. Careful examination of the characteristics and circumstances of the specific target audiences was the key in the successful creation of messages and the strategic steps to take in implementing them (Bramsted, 1965). Goebbels also assembled a team of advisors who were experts in all disciplines related to communication. He reserved the right to make the final decisions – and he was very jealous with this prerogative – but he wanted to make sure that those decisions were very well founded (Bramsted, 1965).

Another feature of Goebbels’ propaganda activity that foreshadowed the contemporary practice of strategic communication was the exact definitions of target audiences based on demographic characteristics. Above all, the educational and intellectual level of the audience would determine the way messages were designed, framed and delivered. National-Socialist indoctrination was served in packages that tended to convey the message that every single individual – or at least every individual who fit into the Nazi human ideal – was a part of the government (Sington & Weidenfeld, 1943). The first use of defining the target audience was the selection of the right channels to reach them: “When running specific propaganda campaigns and appeals, each of the various mass media was often allotted special tasks and functions by the propaganda Ministry.” (Bramsted, 1965, p.57)

The most basic messages on which the Nazi ideology rested were packaged in symbols that everyone recognized and associated with National-Socialist values. The German flag, the imperial eagle, the iron cross and, of course, the swastika were omnipresent. The flag has always been an excellent instrument to summarize agonal virtues, the principles and values of a society of warriors, like fatherland, sacrifice, faith, hope, race, loyalty, honor, or victory (Hoffmann, 1996). Flags are the perfect complement to the epic genre to which the National-Socialist party wanted to link its ideology.

The best example of the presence and use of the flag can be found in Leni Riefenstahl’s documentary movies. Riefenstahl was the official visual rapporteur of Goebbels’ Propaganda Ministry. Her movies “used the flag as an emotional and sentimental prop with which to orchestrate a dizzying symphony of flags which disseminated the Nazi world-view in staged aesthetic events that indicated the “correct” way to regard art.” (Hoffmann, 1996 p.18) Those movies are now studied as an example of effectiveness – an effectiveness not without its certain degree of poetry. The Triumph of the Will, made to celebrate the 1934 session of the Nazi party congress, and Olympia, which bears witness of the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin, make use of those symbols as the visual element that gives meaning to the ecstasy of the crowd. Paradoxically, Leni Riefenstahl, a talented film director who revolutionized the technique and aesthetic of documentary film making, never admitted to being a National-Socialist. In spite of that, no other German propagandist was able to express with such poetic power the moral values associated to the symbols that gave cohesion to Hitler’s Germany.

Feindbilder (Images of the Enemy)

The final goal of all communications strategies organized and implemented by the National-Socialist Ministry for the People’s Enlightenment and Propaganda was to create a sense of community, the strong feeling of belonging together (Reeves, 1999). To this end, the Führer followed the advice of his loyal propaganda minister: “Hitler’s insistence on the importance of an emotional appeal to the target audience is repeatedly illustrated in the propaganda that helped to build popular support for National Socialism.” (Reeves, 1999, p.86) Simple messages, passionately delivered in impressive scenarios would necessary serve the purpose of stirring up emotions – at the time that they eluded critical thinking processes in the mass audience that could have revealed the inconsistence, the absurdity and the atrocity of those values used to effectively create the sense of community. The figure of the leader (der Führer) incarnates all the traditional German values that constituted the columns of the community: “in Hitler, the people would find the complete expression of all the German virtues, the one man uniquely capable of acting only in ways that would serve the true interest of the nation.” (Reeves, 1999, p.88) Goebbels constructed this image during the electoral campaign that allowed Hitler to seize power. His task in front of the Propaganda Ministry was, according to Reeves (1999), to transform the admiration into uncritical obedience, to create the basis for a mystic worship of the Führer.

Still, when it comes to drawing people together, nothing was more effective than a Feindbild (concept of the enemy). The German term Feindbild (with the plural ending Feindbilder), whose literal translation would be “image of the enemy”, has established itself in the social and political sciences literature. Elias Canetti emphasizes in his “Masse und Macht” (Crowds and Power, Canetti, 1973) the usefulness of such “images” in the popular mind to homogenize masses and generate what Walter Lippmann (1925) had called a general will. The Feindbild – or concept of enemy – reduces the natural complexity of social or political phenomena into a stereotype of easy comprehension, assimilation and use. On the level of Realpolitik – another German term of common use, which could be translated as pragmatic politics –, the Feindbild works on the basis of symbols that, following Walter Lippmann (1925, p.38) again, “assemble emotions after they have been detached from their ideas”. From a historical perspective, it is interesting to note that totalitarian regimes put special emphasis in the construction and dissemination of Feindbilder. The social-psychological effects of an enemy’s archetype will always suit the attempts to control that volunté generale Jean Jacques Rousseau (1962) defined for the first time. The Feindbilder feed fear – and also feeds themselves from the fear, the Ur-Gefühl – original emotion par excellence. The intensification of fear necessarily favors the repressive machinery of any state or regime.

There were several Feindbilder, concepts and images of the enemy, instrumentally used by the NAZI regime. In fact, Goebbels systematically tried to destroy any kind of religious, ideological, or ethical system that could threaten in the short or in the long term the hegemony of National-Socialism. Yet, the brutal racial cleansing suffered by the German Jewish population made this group the Feindbild per se of the National-Socialism. As Reeves (1999) states, to maximize the hatred against the future victims became a priority for the government.

Anti-Semitic Film

Joseph Goebbels saw in the cinema the perfect means to reach the broadest – and probably less sophisticated audiences in the country. Narrative, in general, and filmic narrative in particular is an easy way to convey messages about moral values. Those messages easily penetrate into the awareness of the people because spectators tend to identify themselves with the characters of the stories. Goebbels did not discover the potential of movies to achieve this goal, though. The moviemakers in the Soviet Union had been using movies as a means of ideological propaganda for almost two decades.

When the National-Socialists seized power in 1933, there were three main film studios in Germany: Terra, the company that had been responsible for the party propaganda in the early years, TOBI, which introduced talking pictures in Germany, and UFA, pioneer in the European movie business. Of course, Goebbles immediately took control over the three companies after the creation of his particular ministry. Very soon, the three companies merged, leaving only the UFA. To support the whole film industry, the Nazi government founded the Film Credit Bank (FKB – Film Kreditbank), which was supposed to give money on very favorable terms to all filmmakers who wanted to contribute to the National-Socialist, or German cause (Bramsted, 1965, p.82). The institution started very modestly, with only 22 short and feature movies in 1933, but in 1936, the institution financed over 70% of the whole German film industry (Rentschler, 1996). The ministry studied the possible effects of movies on the audiences. Goebbels and his team established a list of categories in which movies could be used for propaganda purposes: “The scale of values according to which the censorship committee apportions its praise has six gradations. A film can be adjudged (I) particularly valuable politically and artistically; (2) valuable politically and artistically; (3) valuable politically; (4) valuable artistically; (5) cultural valuable; (6) of education valuable.” (Sington & Weidenfeld, 1943, p.212) Of course, censorship was fierce. Films that did not fit in any of the six categories enumerated by the Propaganda Ministry did not have much chance of being produced. Direct criticism against the regime had severe consequences.

Goebbels articulated his propaganda philosophy in the Film Law of 1934. He had the final decision whether a movie was going to be produced or not. He personally ensured that all the heads of the film offices were people loyal to the regime. Finally, the minister also developed strategies to distribute the movies abroad.

Some of the movies produced by the regime directly exalted the values of the national-socialism. SA-MannBrand: Ein Lebensbild aus unseren Tagen, for instance, praised the example of Herbert Norkus, an SA member who died in the Berlin street battles that preceded the electoral victory of the NSDAP. This movie portrayed the victim as a martyr of the holy cause and conveyed the message that there is no higher ambition than to give one’s life for the National-Socialist cause. (Faletti, 2000)

Other movies focused on the Feindbilder (images of the enemy) of the regime and were used for ideological indoctrination. I Accuse (Ich Klage and, 1941), for instance, is an apology of euthanasia. The national-socialist regime, in its delirium of racial purity, had established a program of racial cleansing that tried to eliminate signs of mental or physical incapacity. In the movie, an idealist scientist frees his young wife who suffered and incurable disease from the pain of life (Sington & Weidenfeld, 1943).

Films could also be made to denounce or discredit foreign powers perceived as enemies. My Life for Ireland (Mein Leben für Irland, 1941) is perhaps the best example of this. In this movie, the British government appears as an advocate of repressive imperialism. Ohm Krueger (1941) also links British colonial policy with imperialism. The film portrayed the Boer War “through Nazi eyes”. At the end of the movie, the main character prophesized the rise of a pure and superior nation that will finally neutralize British colonial abuse (Sington & Weidenfeld, 1943).

The most vilified Feindbild of National-Socialism films was the Jewish people. Film stories portrayed the characteristic features of the Jewish stereotype. In The Rothschilds (1940), for instance, the director Erich Waschneck pillories in a rough way the urge traditionally ascribed to this ethnic group to reap money and attain power (Blobner & Holba, 1966). The movie describes from an anti-Semitic point of view the career of the bankers Nathan and James Rothschild. Both characters are presented as greedy old men who, in spite of their immense wealth, live in a miserable environment surrounded by all kind of vermin (Courtade & Cadars, 1977). The story of the Rothschilds also makes clear that the financial activity of such Jewish entrepreneurs was the cause of Great Britain’s unavoidable decadence (Hollstein, 1971).

Jud Süß (1940) directed by the UFA star Veit Harlan and based on the novel of the well known anti-Semitic author Wilhelm Hauff, focused on the story of the Jewish tax official Joseph Süß Oppenheimer. The story is a historical drama placed in the city of Heidelberg during the first half of the 18th century. Süß Oppenheimer’s job was to collect money for Karl Alexander Duke von Württemberg. The character illustrates the characteristic avarice of the stereotype – and, of course, abuses his position to enrich himself at the expense of honest people. At the end of the movie the main character is executed, which seems to have been the end of the historical figure on which both the novel and the movie are based.

To the traditional features of greed and power fixation, Jud Süß adds promiscuity to the Jewish stereotype. The main character, played by the great actor Ferdinand Marian covets the pure Aryan Dorothea, who, of course, rejects all his approaches. Süß kidnaps the young woman and rapes her. Dorothea, not being able to stand the shame of her honor having been stained by a Jew, commits suicide.

This film was uncommonly successful. The number of people who watched Jud Süß in Germany was estimated at 20 million. The film also enjoyed some international acclaim. At the Venice Film Festival it was shown with notable success. The Venice Film Festival, like the whole Italy, was at the time under the control of Fascism and its leader Mussolini.

Joseph Goebbels’ propaganda Ministry also produced some documentary movies with the aim of exalting the virtues of the regime and vilifying the image of the enemies, above all the Jewish population. The most infamous of those documentary movies is now Der ewige Jude (The eternal Jew, 1940). This movie is a systematic deconstruction of all possible aspects of Jewish culture – and a resentful defamation of all the achievements of individuals that belong to this ethnic group, such as Albert Einstein, Ernst Lubitsch, and Rosa Luxemburg.

Jews are blamed in this movie for all possible evils, from unemployment and inflation to social disorder, lack of hygiene, and pests. They are portrayed as parasites of the different nations that took them in. The director, Fritz Hippler, uses some harsh visual allegories. In one sequence of the movie, the viewers sees a pack of rats causing destruction while the narrator of the movie in voice-over compares the plagues carried by those animals with the presence of Jewish people in any human community.

The Eternal Jew used to precede Jud Süß in movie theaters. It is also reported that Heinrich Himmler required all the members of the SS, as well as the guardians in the concentration camps, to watch this movie in order to inflame their anti-Semitism (Mannes, 1999).

Of course, none of those movies would stand a critical analysis. There was no warrant to support the racist claims and the defamation of historical figures. In some cases, the information was obviously wrong. The Eternal Jew, for instance, portrayed Charlie Chaplin as Jew, although he had no connection at all with this ethnic group. Especially irritating is that, when they wanted to portray images of dirty Jewish people, they used pictures from the NAZI concentration camps. Thus, the movie worked as self-fulfilling prophecy. The Jewish misery that was caused by the anti-Semitic policies of the National-Socialist regime was used to discredit that ethnic group. In spite of this pathetic lack of rational foundation, the messages reached their target population and contributed to strengthen the hatred against the Jewish Feindbild.

Power’s Only Source

Joseph Goebbels became an authority in matters that concerned the public mind. And the most important lesson he learned and applied was a concept that we have encountered and will constantly encounter in the history of strategic communication. Political power always rests on the great body of people that builds the community: “In order to direct and control people’s minds propaganda has to be in close contact with the feelings of the people, with their reactions to events and to the measures decided upon by the Powers–that-be. If it cannot be an independent “public opinion,” there is still a “public mood” which has to be ascertained, studied and tabulated. In order to be effective, the totalitarian rulers have, so to speak, to carry out their own Gallup poll on the reactions and attitudes of the masses”. (Bramsted, 1965, p.53). In this regard, Goebbels was not very different from contemporary communication consultants in the field of politics. The ambition of controlling the public will is probably as old as human society. And it is remarkable that the first philosophical attempts to explain what human communication is and how it works was aimed at the psychological mechanism to influence the mind of the people.

In ancient Greece, the sophists taught the native Athenians the art of Rhetoric, which was the first systematic attempt to explain how persuasive communication works. They also wrote speeches and helped manage the public image of those citizens who were interested in participating in the administration and government of the polis. The sophists, with candid arrogance, thought that they were able to control and to manipulate opinion through the skillful use of words. Gorgias even asserted that speech had a kind of magic power and compared its effects on the soul to the “power of drugs over the nature of bodies” (2001, p. 46).

Plato, in his argument against the sophists, reproached their arrogance which he thought came from their ignorance. Plato realized that it is a sheer illusion to believe that power might allow you to control public opinion. Disputing Gorgia’s conviction, Plato (1987) concluded that it is not just impossible to control the people (demos) by means of words, but that those who want to achieve the form of power the sophists were interested in will always end up indulging the demands and expectation of public opinion. Never will power be achieved without the support of people. And never will the social body give power to those who oppose its core values.

Plato’s ideas remain an axiom in contemporary society. Hannah Arendt (1969: 56), born in a family of German Jews, knew first hand the horror of National-Socialism. In her work she explores the relationship between power and violence. Both concepts, in her opinion, are practically antonyms. Violence always appears when real power is missing. Without the support of a particular social body, there cannot be power. And supported just by violence, no regime can last. She concludes that the expression absolute power is an oxymoron. In no way can power be regarded as absolute because, since its final source is opinion, a fluid element, power will always be fluid as well.

Michel Foucault created the somewhat imprecise term discourse to designate this fluid foundation of power. Foucault (1972) conceives the discourse as a set of “reflexive categories, principles of classification, normative rules, institutionalized types” that fixes and orders the use of language, canalizes and shapes thinking, and sets itself up as a standard of any form of knowledge. According to Michel Foucault, all manifest discourse, or any discursive formation, is defined by an “already-said”, which also contains the “repressive presence of what it does not say”. (Foucault, 1972, p.25) Such systems basically determine the use and meaning of language. And the major function of language, as Aristotle observed for the first time, is to allow us “to have any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust” (1984b: 1253a). Language, that is, the ability to interact through the use of arbitrarily created symbols, is the distinguishing feature of the human species, and the reason why human life and society are organized on the basis of moral categories.

Discourse, through its authority over language, establishes the standards of what is right and what is wrong as well as what is regarded as morally correct and morally false. The discourse provides us with the linguistic formulas to express it as well. There are discursive formations, specific manifestations of discourse, at any time and in any given society. We can find such particular manifestations of discourse in the different groups, social circles, areas of knowledge, or institutions which belong to the same culture. Every discursive formation generates its own power structures, for discourse is, according to Foucault, the only source of power: “But basically in any society, there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterize and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated, nor implanted without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse” (Foucault, 1980, p.93). Discourse creates truth, a certain truth, the certitude of what is right and wrong at any given time, and only in this truth power can rest: “We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth.” (Foucault, 1980, p.93) Thus, those who hold power will not be able to determine the discourse. Rather power will come to those who are able to decipher and articulate the truth of discourse. Michel Foucault suggests that in every cell of human coexistence, a particular form of discourse will spontaneously arise. This idea has, for him, the unappealable validity of an axiom. And this form of discourse is what determines the knowledge, the beliefs and values that every individual holds and that is the compass for behavior. The effectiveness of the power that flows from discourse comes from the fact that every member of the human community is, at the same time, “exercising and undergoing this power” (Foucault, 1980, p.98).

The discourse exerts its power, first of all, over the individual, but in the long run it also shapes the nature, character, functions and competencies of human institutions or even the contents of disciplines of knowledge. Institutions, such as the Church or the Law, and the dogmas of scientific knowledge at any given time are just the face of the inner order, or “normalization” in Foucault’s vocabulary, created by the discourse (Foucault, 1980).

Frequently, Adolf Hitler and his NSDAP are presented in history as the incarnation of evil – and they are blamed with the accusation of having poisoned the German people with hideous ideas that led to the final horror of the death camps and World War II. The paradox is that the immense power of this individual and his party came from the fact that they were able to read, to interpret and to articulate a particular manifestation of discourse. This statement, of course, does not exculpate the criminal actions of the individuals. Moral accountability can only fall upon individuals, individuals that take advantage of criminal ideas – or use ideas as excuse to commit crimes. Yet, we need to stress that National-Socialist ideas would have never thrived if the discourse, or the public opinion, or the social body, or whatever we call that very heart of power, had not been a convenient hotbed for their growth.

It will not help to present the National-Socialist propagandists as dark characters with mysterious – almost mystic powers – who were able to spellbind the will of the people. They had no magic formula or supernatural power. The key to their terrible social impact was their ability to articulate the zeitgeist of the time. Hitler and his communication agent, Joseph Goebbels, were able to touch the feelings of the German population. With their strong emotional appeals, they, consciously or unconsciously, awoke the beast that always inhabits the core of any human community.

Conclusions

After we have analyzed the systematic use of propaganda during the NAZI regime, we must come back to the question that opened this chapter: Is there, in fact, any difference between propaganda and strategic communication?

In Germany, of course as a consequence of recent history, there is an ardent scholarly controversy about this topic. Michael Kunczik (1996), for instance, does not seem to find any actual difference between the terms advertising, public relations and propaganda. He even defined them as “semantic baubles”. (Kunczick 1996, p.15) Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann (Noelle-Neumann & Schulz, 1971) goes a step further and defined public relations as just a euphemism for propaganda. According to this author, professionals in the field of communication implanted the new term to avoid the heavy stigma that the word propaganda had acquired with the passing of time.
Other German authors resolutely reject this identification of propaganda and sound strategic communication. The Sociologist Eugen Buß, for instance, believes that the methods of both disciplines are incompatible. Propaganda, as a form of public communication, polarizes, radicalizes and emotionalizes discourse (Buß, 1992).

If we accept Buß distinction, the problem that we may have is that a high percentage of the activity that we now call strategic communication would fit neatly into the category of propaganda. For the practice of political communication constantly tends to adopt radical positions, to polarize public opinion and to ensure the effectiveness of its messages with the recurrent appeal to the emotions of the target audiences. On the other hand, many of the strategies and techniques of propaganda also apply for strategic communication. Goebbels’ activity as Propaganda Minister gives us an excellent example. His course of action could be the basis for any communication textbook. He used scientific research methodologies to explore the characteristics of the public. On the basis of this knowledge, Goebbels defined target audiences based on common features. The messages were created and delivered through the channels that most probably would help reach the specific public. All these characteristics have become axioms in contemporary professional communication and are taught in practically every introductory course in this discipline.

In addition to these principles, Goebbles opted for the structural simplicity and the emotional intensity of messages when it came to influencing broad masses of people. His office put special emphasis in the creation of symbols that were attached to those simple ideas and strong emotions. Modern communication, in part as a consequence of communication overload, also tends to reduce complexity in the creation of messages, and to increase the emotional load to gain attention, create awareness, or influence the mind or the behavior of the people.

If the strategies, techniques and methods are the same, what is the difference between strategic communication and propaganda then?

Horst Avenarius (2000), German communication scholar, believes that the ethical moment is what differentiates propaganda from the comtemporary professional communication. In this regard, he agrees with the vast majority of American communication scholars, who see in the manipulation the most relevant feature of propaganda, while they describe the communication discourse generated by strategic communiction as “ethically sound” (Harlow, 1976), mostly concerned with establishing “mutually beneficial relationships” (Cutlip, Center & Broom, 1985) or even with the “public interest” (Harlow, 1976). In fact, one of the missions of the numerous public relations professional and academic associations all over the world, such as the PRSA (Public Relations Society of America), is to emphasize the importance of establishing and maintaining ethical standards for the profession.

Public relations could be simply defined as the strategic use of communication to reach goals. And these goals normally imply the change of mind or behavior of our target audience. Thus, public relations having to do with persuasion, is a form of persuasive discourse. Communication might be a powerful instrument to influence individuals or masses. It can also become a weapon to be used in ideological battles. As any other weapon, communication is morally neutral. The moral value or load will depend on the use individuals or institutions do with this powerful instrument. Communication, as this chapter showed, can be used with the most perverse effects: the annihilation of ethnic or racial groups and the implantation of the cruelest form of totalitarianism. Still, communication can also be used to promote noble causes or help people in need. The construction of messages when trying to move people to donate blood is frequently based on emotional appeals, too. And those appeals are related to symbols to which the individuals of the target audience can relate to. If strtategic communication, as a professional discipline, is only portrayed as the ethical use of communication, then we can agree with Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and consider the concept a euphemism for propaganda, which is not necessarily wrong. Public Relations, the concept, is one of the consequences of the ethical discussion on the subject of communication. This must be a subject of constant reflection and must go beyond the use of words and the creation of new terms to avoid the connotation acquired by words in the course of history. Today, the very term public relations seems to have gained pejorative connotations itself. Frequently, PR practitioners are referred as Spin Doctors, to stress the lack of trustworthiness of the whole branch. And, of course, this accelerates the dynamic of generating new names to avoid linguistic stigmas. New academic programs in strategic, corporate or organizational communication or integrated marketing communication are created, trying to avoid the negative image that the profession of public relations has gained. Regardless of the words used, the ethical issues in the field of communication will remain the same.

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